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This paper proposes an analytical framework for analysing innovation policies in catching-up
economies. The framework combines two dynamic trajectories that affect innovation policy
– policy content and policy governance context – and builds an approach that looks at inno-
vation-policy governance through a multi-level concept of policy coordination. The paper
argues that for understanding and analysing innovation-policy governance systems, the com-
prehension  of  the  developments  in  the  field  of  public-administration-and-management
research and practice is as necessary as understanding developments in the field of innova-
tion-policy research and practice because the developments in the former partly condition
what are the feasible models for increasing the effectiveness of innovation-policy governance.
The paper applies the framework to two stylised case studies – Estonia and Brazil – and
shows that the framework is useful for revealing the complexities of innovation-policy gov-
ernance that are overlooked in narrow innovation policy analysis and shows that innovation-
policy governance challenges may be more complex than usually presumed.
1. Introduction
Academic discourse on managing innovation policies (IP; understood as
actions by public organisations that influence the development and diffusion
of innovations) in the catching-up context seems to be stuck between a
rock and a hard place. On the one hand, classic studies by Evans (1995),
Wade (1990), Amsden (1989) and others about the developmental states
in East Asia, India and Latin America have shown the importance of at least
a close approximation of Weberian civil service headed by some kind of
nodal key agency (e.g. MITI in Japan) in charge of coordinating and leading
long-term policy efforts towards development. On the other hand, research
inspired by public choice and neoclassical theories stresses the importance
of avoiding government failures and alleviating key market failures (such as
challenges to coordination of investments) and leaving the rest to function-
ing markets cushioned by working institutions. (See, e.g., Rodrik, 2007 and
2008 as perhaps the best examples) While the differences are substantial
(see further Karo and Kattel, 2010b), both approaches have one common
shortcoming: neither deals with the issue of how the respective Weberian
or institutional capacities (seen here as state capacities – encompassing
policy and administrative capacities – for enhancing innovation in the pri-
vate sector) are in fact created and sustained.
1 In essence, both approach-
es have historical answers but not theoretical solutions. Accordingly, both
have little to say once historical circumstances change.
2
1 The discussions on state capacities are rather broad and dynamic (see also Grindle, 1996) encom-
passing issues of political, economic, national resources; international relations and power plays; size
of the state etc. Here we look at state capacity from the perspective of policy and administrative
capacity (see Painter and Pierre 2005; Karo and Kattel 2010a). It is considered here that policy and
administrative capacity are conditioned by other variables mentioned above, and thus state capaci-
ty is not a simple sum of policy and administrative capacity. State capacity is seen first as legitima-
cy and second as the ability/capability of the state to intervene in certain societal affairs, such as
economic and technological development that is conditioned by different variables.Therefore, we argue that most IP debate is stuck in the rhetoric that purports
that catching-up countries need to enhance policy and administrative capac-
ity  (either  in  terms  of  effectiveness  or  efficiency)  or  policy  coordination
capacities without properly understanding the content and inter-linkages of
these terms and recommendations. In what follows, we propose to tackle
precisely this question of how the state capacities for IP can be understood
from  an  analytical  perspective  by  creating  a  conceptual  framework  that
makes it possible to look beyond conventional wisdom of IP governance.
The paper is structured as follows: In the following section, we will highlight
our arguments why there is a need for a new conceptual framework. This
will be followed by an overview of theoretical premises and a proposed con-
ceptual framework that bridges IP and public administration and management
(PAM) research through the lens of coordination of public policies, such as
IP. It will be argued that IP failures and IP capacity problems cannot be fully
comprehended without taking into account the PAM perspective on policy-
making and implementation – analysis will hopefully highlight that IP making
and implementation is much more detailed and complex arena than the usual
research on IP has been able to encompass. Subsequent sections will apply
the framework to two seemingly highly different cases – Estonia (an Eastern
Europe small economy) and Brazil (a Latin-America large economy) – to illus-
trate the utility of the framework for analysing and making sense of the prob-
lems of IP capacity development in the catching-up context.
2. Empty and overlooked spaces in innovation policy discourse
2.1 Coordination as the perceived key innovation policy challenge
There seems to be an almost consensual agreement in IP discourse that IP
in catching-up economies is partly hampered by weak state capacity, in the
form of either policy or administrative capacity or both (for an overview of
arguments,  see  Karo  and  Kattel,  2010a;  Kattel,  2010a;  Piech  and
Radosevic, 2006; Reinert et al., 2009). To simplify, IP rhetoric usually ends
in a tautological or ‘dead-end’ conclusion: weak state capacity is caused by
weak  policy  coordination  and,  accordingly,  governments  should  work
towards better ‘policy coordination’ (e.g. OECD, 2005; Box, 2009; EIPR,
2008 and 2009). The truth in this simplification is that IP research hardly
ever deals in detail with how the coordination problems are, in the first
place, caused by various policy and administrative processes and how to
overcome them. Further, the IP research hardly ever defines precisely what
is explicitly meant by ‘coordination problems’.
For example, OECD innovation strategy (OECD, 2010) and European bench-
marking activities on IP governance (EIPR, 2009; also OECD, 2005) empha-
sise that one of the crucial challenges of IP is to increase policy coordination.
3Problems of coordination are seen to stem from both vertical (ministries –
agencies)  and  horizontal  (between  different  policy  fields)  specialisa-
tion/fragmentation and compartmentalisation of IP brought about either by the
evolution of IP (becoming more broad and extensive) or by governance sys-
tems in general. Subsequently, these documents recommend introducing new
policy  coordination  mechanism  to  solve  the  problems.  The  overall  under-
standing of IP and IP governance is then presented as a conceptual benchmark
model for catching-up and developing economies. Another good example from
the recent literature is the excellent study by Reichman (2009) on policy flex-
ibilities for developing countries under TRIPS (WTO’s 1994 agreement on
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights). One of the main recommendations
– along many detailed flexibilities – is that interagency coordination of intel-
lectual-property-rights (IPR) policy in a country seems to be the most impor-
tant factor in determining whether a given country is able to develop IPR poli-
cies (under TRIPS) designed to its needs or not. (See also Deere (2009) on
varying TRIPS implementation regimes among developing countries) 
At the same time, PAM scholars who study governance and policy imple-
mentation issues in modern states (e.g. Peters 1998) argue that the problem
of policy coordination can also be viewed as partly unsolvable challenge for
policy-makers and civil servants. Coordination problems stem from situations
where past or existing structures and practices clash with present or future
needs. So, efficiencies, increasing returns, but also information asymmetries
etc. created by existing governance systems make structural and functional
transformations  to  new  systems  an  incremental,  contextual  and  path-
dependent process (see also Peters, 2005). The PAM research highlights
(e.g. Drechsler, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Verhoest and Bouckaert,
2005; Verhoest et al., 2007) that governance reforms (over the last three
decades) have tried to solve the problems of policy coordination in some-
what contradicting paths or cycles. At first, it was attempted (under the neo-
liberal labels of managerialism and New Public Management – NPM – that
were translated into ‘good governance’ for the Washington Consensus poli-
cies) to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector through
decentralising the highly monolithic Weberian governance structure (to fos-
ter coordination mainly by market mechanisms).
2 Thereafter, the new chal-
lenge has become (labelled as the Neo-Weberian State) to consolidate the
decentralised and fragmented structures (i.e. dislocated and fragmented pol-
icy  capacities)  through  contextual  mixes  of  coordination  practices  that
encompass hierarchical, market- and network-based mechanisms. 
4
2 Randma-Liiv (2009) has argued that in the context of catching-up economies these reforms move-
ments lack any substantive logic because the NPM-type reforms have been intended to reform the
rigidities and inefficiencies of the Weberian state (too much regulation, too much hierarchy etc.) but
in the case of the catching-up context, the problem is often the lack of basic stability usually creat-
ed by Weberian principles (thus problems are partly caused by too much bureaucracy in certain pol-
icy fields and too little bureaucracy in others).5
Thus, the PAM reform debates and trajectories have centred on fundamen-
tal choices, and subsequent compromises, between: 
• centralised/hierarchical/consolidated  vs.  decentralised/flexible/ 
fragmented administrative (governance) structures; 
• classical Weberian civil service systems (based on the career sys-
tem, merit-based recruitment, the ethos of public sector etc. influ-
encing and motivating the behaviour of civil servants) vs. a mana-
gerial state (based on open civil-service systems, private-sector 
management  techniques,  individual  and  organisational  perfor-
mance measurement and management systems that influence and
motivate the behaviour of public sector professionals). 
In  sum,  the  IP  discourse  in  general  tends  to  interpret  the  specializa-
tion/fragmentation  of  the  policy  system  and  the  need  for  coordination
mechanisms as inherent characteristic of the IP governance (specialization
increases functional efficiency and coordination increases policy effective-
ness), to which feasible ideal-type solutions (coordination mechanisms) can
be designed. The PAM literature interprets the linkages between specialisa-
tion/fragmentation and coordination in a more complex manner highlighting
historically  and  contextually  opposing  practices  to  solve  the  problems.
Therefore, increasing the coordination of fragmented policy cycles is a more
complex and contextual task than presumed by the IP discourse because
coordination mechanisms usually intentionally contradict or counter-balance
existing contextual structural and functional interaction modes (e.g. regula-
tions coordinate free markets) in order to re-balance information and com-
munication flows within and across specific policy-cycles. 
2.2 Changing historical circumstances and path dependencies in catching-up 
economies
Looking at the IP rhetoric, it can be concluded that the previous views of
state-led technological and economic development (classic industrial poli-
cy) have been replaced by a more systemic view (innovation systems and
policies) (Soete, 2007; Sharif, 2006). Thus, IP is a highly complex policy
that covers (horizontally) many traditional policy areas and is implemented
in the ‘gray zone’ of state-society relationships (close systemic linkages
between the state, industry and other stakeholders). The systemic view
has seen, especially in catching-up regions, both ‘market-based’ and ‘net-
work’,  or  public-private  partnership  (PPP)  based  versions  of  it  (see
Radosevic, 2009; Kattel and Primi, 2010). Overall, these changes question
the relevance of past classic studies on development (e.g. Amsden, Evans,
Wade) that place the highly active and capable state at the centre of inno-
vation and development. Indeed, today’s catching-up countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe
(and elsewhere) have pursued economic development in a different context
than prescribed by these classic studies. Latin America and Eastern Europe
have been under rather similar external pressures to converge with the so-
called  Washington-Consensus  policies  that  also  have  included  a  public-
choice-based view of government policies and administration (‘good gover-
nance’ and the NPM). The criticism of the Washington Consensus eco-
nomic policies in the context of development has become rather widespread
(e.g. Cassiolato and Vitorino, 2009; Cimoli et al., 2009; Lundvall et al.,
2009; Radosevic, 2009; Varblane et al., 2007; Rodrik, 2007; Serra and
Stiglitz, 2008), much the same way as NPM (and good governance) have
been criticised in PAM research (e.g. Drechsler, 2004, 2005; Pollitt and
Bouckaert, 2004).
The legacies of the Washington Consensus period IP (horizontal or market-
based IP) have eroded the majority of the pre-Washington Consensus peri-
od state capacities in the policy area, and post-Washington Consensus pol-
icy choices have been significantly reduced (see more below). Persisting
external pressures on IP are further created through financial conditionali-
ties of the IFIs (IMF, EU), and the normative spread of IP ideas (e.g. the
PPP/participatory model). To complicate the policy challenges, catching-up
countries lag behind developed countries both in terms of technological
capabilities (placed towards the low end of value chains of global produc-
tion) and institutional capacities (both knowledge creation and entrepre-
neurship, but also policy and administrative). Further, in most cases, insti-
tutional development may be much harder than technological progress. (See
Chaminade  et  al.,  2009;  Mazzoleni  and  Nelson,  2009;  Lundvall  et  al.,
2009; 2002) Therefore, the challenges of development for these countries
are more complex – not only to transform or refine existing capacities and
capabilities, but to create them from the very basics and under internal (past
legacies)  and  external  pressures  (global  convergence),  which  makes  it
extremely challenging to develop these in a ‘contextualised’ manner (e.g.
Karo and Kattel, 2010a; Kattel, 2010a).
3
Further, it can be argued that the changes in IP have been interlinked with
the ‘techno-economic’ paradigm changes whereby the engine of economic
development has been moved from a mass-production-based economic sys-
tem (vertically integrated organisations creating economies of scale and
scope) to an ICT-based economic system that is dominated by ‘modularity’
6
3 For example, Chibber (2003) offers a comparison between South Korea’s and India’s evolution of
state capacity in the 1950s to the 1970s. As he shows, while the post WWII development con-
sensus reached from Asia to Latin America and encompassed national political and business elites
in many countries, state capacity evolution took highly differing paths with varying resulting eco-
nomic fortunes.7
(horizontal and global networks and linkages creating synergies, flexibility
and the capacity to accommodate with shorter product and technology life-
cycles) (Perez, 2007, 2002). Thus, both societal modes of production and
communication (i.e. creation of information and knowledge) have moved
from classical hierarchical forms to a mode dominated by outsourcing, mod-
ularity, networks and linkages (see, e.g., Benkler, 2006). 
Also, for the government in charge of IP, the forms of desirable and feasi-
ble policies and administrative models must change or be under the pres-
sure for change. Indeed, it can be argued that the cycles of governance and
techno-economic change should be ideally synced in one way or other (see
also Drechsler, 2009), but the interplay of external pressures (technological
changes and/or ideological shifts) and past legacies (existing state capaci-
ties and policy content) make it highly unlikely. This, according to us, is the
root cause of coordination problems in IP.
As pointed out above, Evans has classically argued (1995; also in Evans
and Rauch, 1999) that Weberian bureaucratic principles (mainly meritocrat-
ic recruitment and career system), or even a close approximation of it, are
conducive to economic development as they create a long-term vision, insti-
tutional memory and the ability to reduce transaction and information costs
for the private sector (thus also creating policy and administrative capaci-
ties of the state). According to this logic, one of the characteristics of a
capable state is the ability to be ‘selective’ in choosing the right priorities to
effectively use and further develop existing economic capabilities and insti-
tutional  capacities.  Selectivity  can  also  be  interpreted  as  ‘coordination
capacity’ in developing, designing and implementing policies. 
The problem though is that because of the ideological and techno-econom-
ic paradigm shifts, the analytical value of Weberian ideas may not fit well
into (or be easily legitimised in the policy processes of) the catching-up
countries. Indeed, in Evans’ analytical framework, Weberian structures are
given variables that undergo changes, but whose initial evolution is not
analysed  in  detail  or  in  a  specific  theoretical  framework.  Evans’  thesis
(1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999) of the positive impact of Weberian princi-
ples was based on a compromise on Weberian ideas whereby catching-up
economies had created Weberian structures that relied on the close linkages
and inclusion of industrial or capital elite into the economic policy-making
(see also Evans, 1979). It was largely a matter of coordinating the public
and crucial private interest necessary for development policies (thus creat-
ing ‘embedded autonomy’) that was to be followed by a broader inclusion
of other stakeholders in order to institutionalise economic transformations
through societal transformation. 8
By now Evans himself (2008) recognises that the relevant group of stake-
holders has widened (questioning the scope of the ‘embedded autonomy’)
and become more complex (also foreseen by Evans in his 1995 study),
making it more difficult to legitimise the initial ideas of linkages between
Weberiansim and economic development and close ties between the deter-
mined stakeholders in the policy processes. The change towards modulari-
ty, global outsourcing, global production and innovation networks and value
chains, networking and linkages may be an important advantage for indus-
trialised or developed countries, but for catching-up countries, it creates
important challenges and limits the possibilities for government action (see
also Ernst, 2009). Through modularity, the barriers for catching-up (in eco-
nomic and technological terms) are reinforced and often raised because
development of capabilities and capacities becomes more fragmented (Karo
and Kattel, 2010b; Kattel, 2010a). 
Further, most catching-up countries operate under an international policy
regime unprecedented in history in terms of its reach into domestic policy-
making. WTO and its treaties do not simply limit available policy space (see
Wade, 2003 for a classic summary of arguments), but moreover give vari-
ous stakeholders (e.g. multinational companies; foreign IPR holders etc.)
high bargaining power towards policy-makers of catching-up countries. In
addition, the WTO regime assumes that catching-up economies are able to
implement international treaties according to their own needs. Both stake-
holder bargaining power and implementation capacity assume pre-existing
policy and administrative capacity. Almost all studies, never mind from
which theoretical perspective, agree that this is precisely what these coun-
tries  lack.  In  essence,  while  the  post-WWII  development  consensus
assumed that countries can choose their own policy mix and, further, that
the process of choosing, as a learning process, constitutes a key element
in creating state capacities (also embedding state and business), the WTO
regime turns this around. 
The interplay different external pressures (impacts of Washington Consen-
sus on IP and governance, techno-economic changes, changing interna-
tional political economy) contradict with the past legacies of catching-up
countries and reduce the margin for error for state actions. Policy choices
are limited and state capacity is assumed to exist. In this context, policy
failures, because of the limited alternatives and options for creating policy
capacities, can be comfortably labelled as ‘coordination’ problems to hide
the fundamental challenges. To reveal the latter, the meaning of ‘coordina-
tion’ needs to be more elaborated.9
2.3 Towards a conceptual framework
Given the above, coordination capacity can be perceived as a close proxy
for state capacity – this does not imply that high coordination capacities
automatically bring about higher levels of state capacity and better IP per-
formance, but rather that state capacity in IP is among other things condi-
tioned by coordination capacities. Coordination capacity enables a state to
combine policy, administrative, financial etc. capacities for goal achieve-
ment (e.g. Nassif, 2007 looks at the links between IP and macroeconomic
policy through the lens of coordination; also Kattel, 2010a). As state capac-
ity can be perceived as an interdependent mixture of policy and adminis-
trative capacity (e.g. Painter and Pierre, 2005; Evans, 1995), coordination
is in fact a multi-level and interdependent concept that needs to be refined
and cleared up according to contextual IP challenges. 
Linking the IP and PAM perspectives on IP (as a combination of policy and
administrative features), ‘coordination problems’ of IP can be analysed and
analytically allocated at several levels of the policy process (derived mostly
from arguments by Evans, 1995; 2008 and building on the more detailed
PAM framework of Verhoest et al., 2007)
4:
• Coordination of the policy-making arena – whom (defining stake-
holders)  to  include  and  how  (defining  the  level  and  tools  of 
‘embeddedness’) to include them in the policy-debates over IP, its
priorities (or strategies) and tactics (or measures).
• Inter-policy coordination – to what extent (how widely) and how 
(with what instruments) to coordinate different policy fields (e.g., 
economics, education and research, labour market, finance) that 
define IP.
• Intra-policy coordination – given a defined scope of IP (e.g. sci-
ence and technology – S&T-based view vs. broader institutional
understanding of IP), how to design the policy cycle and what type
of management (and coordination) mechanisms to prefer.
Overall, the three levels indicate the potential sources from where policy
failures or coordination challenges may emerge.
5 In addition, these levels
4 In PAM literature (Peters, 1998; cited also in Verhoest et al. 2007, p. 330): ‘coordination in a pub-
lic sector inter-organizational context is understood as the instruments and mechanisms that aim to
enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts of organizations within the public sec-
tor. These are used in order to create a greater coherence, and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and
contradictions within and between policies, implementation or management’.
5 Also, given the rather narrow (or one-sided) approach of conventional IP and governance research,
it is likely that both fields pre-define coordination problems according to their respective expertise –
IP research is more centred on the inter-policy coordination level and governance research on the
intra-policy level. can also potentially highlight the contextual or developmental differences –
it can be hypothesised that more developed economies (in search for more
efficient and effective IP) face coordination challenges at lower levels of
‘coordination problems’ (inter- and intra-policy) than developing economies
that need to start developing IP from scratch through defining the policy
arena and stakeholders to begin with.
6 Furthermore, it could be hypothe-
sised  that  changes  of  and  dynamics  within  techno-economic  para-
digms/trajectories (or technology life cycles) re-introduce the higher-level
coordination  questions  also  into  the  IP  challenges  of  more  developed
economies. 
Based on these distinctions, it is possible to create an analytical framework
where the different levels of potential coordination challenges are deter-
mined by the prevalent IP models and by the parallel developments of the
state governance structure. Here we presume that, while ideally, these tra-
jectories should be in sync, in practice they hardly ever overlap. External
pressures  and  national  legacies  create  parallel  trajectories  that  need  be
looked into in order to analyse IP developments and define the location of
‘policy coordination’ problems. Thus, coordination problems stem from the
clashes between IP ideas (what is the dominant perspective on IP and
expected IP governance system) and IP governance realities (what is the
current set-up of the governance area of the IP and what are the compet-
ing ideas on governance).
In the first sections of the paper we argued that the IP ideas prevalent in
the catching-up context have moved from a state-led and market-based
models towards a networked or participatory model of IP (Radosevic, 2009;
Kattel and Primi, 2010). This model (in order to work) implicitly presumes
a  highly  capable  and  flexible  state  structure  (from  PAM  research,  see
Goldsmith and Eggers, 2006; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). At the
same time, the governance realities of catching-up countries in general may
provide  less  institutional  and  administrative  capacities  and  flexibilities
because  the  historical  legacies  and  also  the  negative  pressures  of  the
Washington  Consensus  (and  WTO)  era  that  has  eroded  existing  state
capacities. Thus, policy coordination is characterised by persistent clashes
and conflicts between the expectations and realities set by both IP and PAM
perspectives on governance. Figure 1 provides a visual description of the
analytical framework.
10
6 In addition, reflecting the changing nature of influence many economic actors can exert under WTO
regimes upon developing countries’ policy-makers, the linkages between the state and other stake-
holders of IP also becomes an exercise in creating what Galbraith calls countervailing power. As
Reinert argues (2007, 2009), certain economic activities create not simply higher productivity, high-
er wages and up- and downstream synergies, but also specific kinds of economic elites often inter-
ested in enhancing social values such as education and health. (See also Reinert et al., 2009 on failed
states in this context)11
Based on the framework it will be possible to analyse whether the trajec-
tories of IP ideas and supportive IP governance reforms have been in sync.
Given that this is highly unlikely, especially in the context of catching-up
economies,  the  framework  enables  a  further  analysis  for  indicating  the
starting level of coordination problems of IP. The following will highlight
how this can be the case for interpreting IP challenges in Estonia and Brazil.
3. Coordinating innovation policies: Brazil and Estonia compared
At first glance, it might seem odd to compare Brazil (BRA) and Estonia (EST)
from the perspective of IP and governance – cultural, politico-administra-
tive, historical etc. differences should be significant enough to provide large
Figure 1. Framework for analysis
Source: Authors.national differences.
7 On the other hand, Estonia and Brazil also have some
generic similarities as catching-up economies.
8 Crucial similarities for the
current analysis can be found in the IP governance challenges and recent
key reforms.
Namely, the recent analyses of IP developments in EST and BRA (e.g. for
EST see Kattel, 2004; Technopolis, 2006; Karo, 2010; for BRA see Sa,
2005; Nassif, 2007; Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009) reveal that both EST and
BRA have moved during the 2000s onwards from Washington Consensus-
based IP (no-policy policy of the 1990s) towards more conscious IP. The IP-
governance challenges of the 2000s are in both cases summarised in rather
similar terms across the national R&D and IP strategies: low private-sector
investment in R&D; concentration of R&D in the public academic sector;
low levels of cooperation and linkages between academia and industry. 
Since  the  2000s,  both  countries  have  started  to  initiate  explicit  policy
responses – gradually moving from low-priority horizontal IP towards more
prioritised and consciously selective IP. At the same time, in both countries,
there are increasing discussions about problems of policy coordination and
policy implementation (too much bureaucracy etc.). In the following, we
use the analytical framework to analyse the emergence of the IP gover-
nance systems and how the historical legacies and external pressures have
led to current definitions of IP problems.
Table 1 summarises the main historical variables in a comparison that is fol-
lowed by a stylised analysis. The analysis combines the trajectories of IP
ideas and IP-related general governance reforms, and also the development
of the policy arena and definitions of stakeholders that are affected by both
of the former trajectories. The stylised analysis of these trajectories looks
back until the pre-democratic era in order to gain more insight into the
impact of and interplay between historical legacies and external pressures.
12
7 While both BRA and EST are obviously catching-up economies, they could not be more different
in terms of size (190 million vs. 1.3 million), natural resources (BRA has well-known large oil
reserves, EST has some oil shale reserves that are running out within few decades), IP traditions
(BRA’s experience reaches back at least to the 1950s/1960s; while EST had an activist state in the
1930s typical of the time and no autonomous economic and conscious technology policy from the
1940s to the beginning of the 1990s; in recent decades, it has used highly liberal policy regimes)
and global political status (BRA being one of the very few countries daring to take on the USA for
example in WTO and successfully so; EST being a member of the EU and thus having forfeited much
of its foreign policy autonomy).
8 They are similar in the sense that their historical legacies include a fight between democratic and
authoritarian/un-democratic regimes. BRA ended its last military regime in 1985, EST re-established
independence in 1991. Both countries have experienced high-levels of state control and intervention
in economy before the democratisation period. From the start of the democratic period, both coun-
tries were subject to strong external pressure to reform the state and economy under the neo-liber-
al or Washington Consensus agenda.13
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BRA: Post-WC period (2000s)
EST: EU period (2000s)
As explicit narrow understanding of
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– as IP is based on the assessment
that  the  weakest  part  of  the  IP  is
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IP became a market-led policy model
where close ties between state and
the  academic  and  industrial  elite
were  transformed  into  government
responsiveness  to  market  signals
(bottom-up  hierarchical  policies).
During the end of the period, IP striv-
ing towards participatory policy-mak-
ing (or exchange of abstract market
signals  with  more  embedded  net-
works). At the same time there are
indications  that  the  structure  of
industry does not support the emer-
gence of new alliances between the
state, industry and science.
Source: Compiled by the authors based on diverse sources. For BRA, see Evans, 1979; 1995; 2008; Bresser-Pereira, 1999; 2001;
Spink, 1999; Glade, 1999; Gaetani, 2000; de Castro, 1994; Kattel and Primi, 2010; Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009; Nassif, 2007;
Mani, 2001; Sennes, 2009; Villaschi, 2003. For EST, see Kristapsons et al., 2004; Radosevic, 1998; 1999; Kattel et al., 2009;
Karo and Kattel, 2010a; Kattel, 2010b; Karo, 2010; Karo, forthcoming; Masso and Ukrainski, 2009; Kattel, 2004; Kattel and Primi,
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tures.3.1 Trajectories of IP reform in Brazil up to the 2000s
3.1.1 ISI period from the 1960s - 1980s
The emergence of the explicit IP ideas in BRA can be tracked back to the
development of science and technology (S&T) policy during the 1960s as
part of the ISI (import substitution industrialisation) policy. The emergence
of the policy field started with the creation of the National Council for
Science  and  Technology  (CNPq)  and  federal  sectoral  R&D  institutes  in
strategic fields (e.g. aerospace, space industry) in the 1950s. The ISI poli-
cy  was  largely  based  on  foreign  investment  and  technology  that  was
steered through policies of protection, promotion and regulation aimed at
inter-sectoral  integration  and  product  diversification.  (Koeller  and
Cassiolato, 2009, p. 38) As the chosen ISI policy and the aims of techno-
logical development were rather complex and intensive, it resulted also in
several new institutional transformations over the decades – e.g. the cre-
ation of state-owned enterprises (Petrobras in 1953), agencies with special
tasks  for  S&T  policy  (e.g.  BNDES  created  the  National  Technical  and
Scientific  Fund  in  1964;  FINEP,  the  Agency  for  Financing  Studies  and
Projects was set-up in 1969). Koeller and Cassiolato (2009) have argued
that the end of the 1960s and the 1970s differed from previous areas of
S&T efforts as the economic growth had allowed significant amounts of
resources to be directed to the field. Nassif (2007) has argued that S&T pol-
icy was allowed to grow because most military governments of the period
placed a high emphasis on S&T autonomy. Thus, the design and imple-
mentation of S&T policy became more complex and was steered through
the National Development Plans of the 1970s (for large scale investments)
and a special emphasis on S&T planning (3 plans adopted throughout the
1970s to the mid-1980s) that first emphasised new technologies and spe-
cific industries (energy, microelectronics, aerospace), but by the 1980s had
become increasingly horizontal (Nassif, 2007, pp. 6-7). One of the key
events for S&T policy coordination was the creation of the position of
Secretary of Industrial Technology in 1972 under the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce. A parallel development was the emergence of FINEP as the
centre of S&T policy. It started to design policies to foster linkages between
the S&T sector and the industrial sector to increase industry R&D because
the ISI period has resulted in high levels of heterogeneity across and with-
in industries (Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009). Indeed, it can be argued that
overall, the S&T system was highly heterogeneous, or fragmented, with
several agencies (e.g. FINEP and BNDES), state-owned enterprises (e.g.
Petrobras, Embraer, EMBRAPA) and also subsidiaries of MNCs pursuing
R&D  efforts  to  build  needed  capacities.  Thus,  S&T  policy  had  become
rather complex and the S&T policy capacity was fragmented across the pol-
icy field, partly because S&T policy had been part of the larger ISI policy –
no ministry of S&T existed at the time; some agencies such as the BNDES
15financed S&T as a side activity; weak linkages between S&T and industry
resulted in industry pursuing its own dislocated strategies.
Next to S&T policy reforms, parallel transformations also took place in the
state governance reforms that further affected the realization of IP ideas
and  trajectory.  BRA  had  inherited  from  the  1930s  and  before  a  rather
Weberian and highly centralised governance model as certain elements of
civil service were constitutionally institutionalised. Also, there was a high
emphasis on the state as an autonomous and leading actor in socio-eco-
nomic development. At the same time, already in the 1950s, the unified
and centralised model was gradually challenged through the creation of
state-owned enterprises and agencies for steering and coordinating policy
areas like S&T. This resulted in the major reform of 1967 (Decree Law 200)
that decentralised the administrative structures, led to de-bureaucratisation
of decentralised units of the government and granted significant autonomy
to these decentralised units. In theory, this should have created contradic-
tions with the general ISI and also S&T policy goals. As the latter required
a high level of state involvement, steering and also selectivity, increasing
the decentralisation and policy autonomy of agencies, state-owned enter-
prises that acted as the ‘hub’ of sectoral policies (i.e. indirect public admin-
istration) should have, increased problems of coordination, accountability,
adaptability/flexibility etc. Also, Bresser-Pereira (1999) has argued that the
military governments potentially reinforced these threats because it placed
little emphasis on developing the core of bureaucracy and most potential
capacity development efforts (e.g. high-level recruitments) were confined to
the indirect administrative system (agencies and enterprises). The latter
was  easier  to  manipulate  (less  bureaucratic  constraints)  for  personal
favouritism, but positively also allowed more flexible policies. Evans (1995,
pp. 107-123) has also argued that the ICT sector was strongly influenced
by regulatory agencies (e.g. Commission of the Coordination of Electronic
Processing Activities) that had been granted significant policy autonomy
and that managed to steer industrial policy (through regulation of imports
for macroeconomic stability) in a manner that fostered the emergence of
ICT capabilities in the 1970s. 
Thus, on the one hand, decentralisation and fragmentation should have cre-
ated problems of policy implementation and coherence (because policies
were highly activist and selective), on the other hand, there seem to be indi-
cations  that  indeed,  it  also  created  some  ‘pockets  of  efficiency’  (e.g.
BNDES,  regulatory  agencies)  (see  also  Evans,  1979;  de  Castro,  1994;
Trebat,  1983;  in  general  also  Wettenhall,  2003).  Thus,  somewhat  per-
versely, developments in IP and governance in general supported each other
enough to generate relatively strong centres of coordination.
16It can be argued (and has been before) that despite the seeming contradic-
tions between S&T policy content and the governance context, the ISI-
based industrialisation and S&T policy period can be evaluated as a relative
success because of peculiar coordination of the policy arena and stake-
holders characterising BRA at the time. Namely, while BRA has been facing
shifts of government regimes over the last century, the country and identi-
ty of the nation were arguably relatively coherent, at least at the level of
state and industrial elite, thus, maintaining a stable stakeholder group for
policy. This is what has been labelled the ‘national project’ for development
that was based on the ‘industrialisation-led development’ relying on close
ties between the state and the capital (both local and foreign) elites (‘triple
alliance’) that was relatively stable through different regimes over the 20
th
century up until the last democratisation era began (Evans, 1979; 1995;
Bresser-Pereira, 2001; Spink, 1999). Thus, the formal state structure that
should have been theoretically inefficient for the S&T policies (IP ideas) of
the time was paralleled by a complementary informal state-society relation-
ship (coordination of the policy arena) that allowed the S&T governance
system to fragment policy autonomy, but created pivotal pockets of effi-
ciency etc. and in the end provide the needed capacity increases.
3.1.2 The Washington Consensus from the 1980s - 1990s  
The 1980s and the increased external macro-economic pressures (external
financing constraints; see Kregel, 2008) turned around the development
model in BRA. Resources for S&T policy dried out significantly (for state
policies in general but also in state-owned enterprises) – e.g. combined
funding of FUNTEC, CNPq and CAPES (Coordinating Committee for Further
Training for Personnel and Higher Education) in 1985 was only 40% of the
1979 funding. At the same time, BRA sought to balance the loss of S&T
funding with a loan from the World Bank (Science and Technology Reform
Support Project to increase and consolidate national scientific competencies
in universities, research centres and enterprises). (Koeller and Cassiolato,
2009, p. 43) This was paralleled by the creation of the Ministry of Science
and Technology in 1985. Thus, it can be seen that the 1980s brought about
changes in both internal IP governance and external macro-economic con-
text, but also significantly increased external pressures on the S&T policy
(external  macroeconomic  constraints  limiting  autonomous  policy  options
and external financing creating further conditionalities). While the previous
era had been based on a rather unconventional S&T policy governance sys-
tem that counterbalanced structural paradoxes with informal coordination of
policy arena and stakeholders, the 1980s started to turn this around.
At the same time, the democratisation process of the 1980s brought about
changes  in  the  general  governance  model.  Bresser-Pereira  (1999)  has
17argued that the new government of the end of the 1980s perceived the old
state model as highly inefficient (based on patronage, corruption and waste)
and  one  of  the  causes  of  economic  decline.  Therefore  the  1998
Constitutional reform sought to clear up the fragmented and unaccountable
state  governance  model  through  a  reinforcement  of  the  centralised
Weberian  model.  The  reform  foresaw  the  re-creation  of  the  classical
Weberian civil service model and reduction of the autonomy of the decen-
tralised state organisations. At the same time, Bresser-Pereira (1999) has
argued that while the problems were mostly defined at the centre of the
bureaucratic core (lack of capacity, legacies of patronage etc.), the reforms
affected  the  whole  governance  model,  or  as  he  has  argued:  ‘semiau-
tonomous agencies, foundations, even joint-capital companies were obli-
gated to employ the same system of civil service examinations’ (p. 128).
Thus, while external macro-economic constraints limited the capacities of
the system and external financial support steered the S&T towards a new
S&T governance or IP model, the reforms of the state governance further
complicated the governance arena with the existing system of ‘pockets of
efficiency’ etc. increasingly losing its’ role as policy hubs.
A look at the coordination of the policy arena and inclusion of stakeholders
in the policy processes provides another crucial argument why the 1980s
were followed by a downgrading of S&T capacities, and the 1980s and
1990s  reflect  lost  decades  in  terms  of  S&T and  innovation  (see  Mani,
2001; Nassif, 2007; Villaschi, 2003). Namely, it can be argued that the
crises of 1980 increased the public distrust in the state and decreased the
capacity of the state to overcome the crises – i.e. the democratisation
process, as pursued (criticism of the state and past institutions as a whole
etc.), reinforced distrust in the state and demolished the past IP stakehold-
er relationships that had provided the informal backbone to the formal S&T
governance system.
9 Thus, while up to the 1980s, the paradoxical S&T
governance  model  provided  significant  capacity  for  development.  The
1980s turned the model towards inefficiency and even decreasing capaci-
ty because the new ideas of IP and governance dismantled or paralysed
existing capacities and presumed that the needed capacities can be easily
inserted into the new governance and IP design.
Thus, the 1990s brought about explicitly no-policy IP period (starting with
the 1980s IP and governance reforms) whereby until the end of 1990s,
18
9 Also, Evans (1995) argued that the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ that was initially limited to
the state and the industrial elite (triple alliance) would have needed to be expanded to include other
parts of the society to provide socio-economic transformations. While BRA managed to show impres-
sive technological development and growth indicators before the 1980s, it did not manage to over-
come the problems of extreme inequalities faced by the country and to transform industrial devel-
opment into socio-economic development.there were no real IP measures, and S&T policy was based on rather limit-
ed investments in the maintenance of infrastructure – monetary instability
and  the  supremacy  of  macroeconomic  concerns  dominated  the  period
(Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009; Nassif, 2007). In general, the period was
characterised by market liberalisation, encouragement of FDI and S&T pol-
icy was steered through horizontal policies. At the same time, macroeco-
nomic constraints complicated the implementation of most designed S&T
and IP measures (such as the Program to Support Technological Capacity
of Industry, PACTI). Nassif (2007) argues that the adoption of Washington
Consensus policy principles resulted in a limited capacity of BRA to incor-
porate  or  coordinate  macroeconomic  policy  with  IP  and  S&T  policy.  In
terms of IP governance, the 1990s were in broad terms limited to the cre-
ation and reform of regulatory agencies (to provide the framework for mar-
ket forces, to conform with the WTO rules). Most emphasis was placed on
a narrow understanding of IP (limited to S&T) and it was limited to high-
technology fields and an emphasis on patenting policies and other aspects
of codified knowledge. Koeller and Cassiolato (2009, p. 47) have argued
that the period resulted in several undesired impacts on the innovation capa-
bilities as liberalisation resulted in: foreign goods replacing domestic machin-
ery and equipment; MNC subsidiaries cutting down local R&D investments
and private R&D increases did not materialise; public R&D institutes mov-
ing  from  research  to  lower-intensity  consulting  activities;  production
becoming less intensive in the use of local engineering and technical capa-
bilities. Thus, the 1980s to1990s resulted in a complete transformation of
IP ideas (from ISI to market-based IP) and resulting innovation capabilities.
At the same time, while the IP content experienced a radical shift in terms
of ideal types and goals, the governance reforms were faced with past lega-
cies and structural contradictions. In the mid-1990s, BRA started to pursue
a managerial reform as a state reform to end the centralisation – decen-
tralisation – centralisation cycle that had affected the state capacity from
the 1930s onwards. The new managerial reform was designed to ‘rethink’
the roles of the state by strengthening the core of the state and giving
autonomy  (managerial  or  administrative,  as  opposed  to  policy)  to
‘autonomous agencies’ and ‘social organisations’. Thus, while the changes
in the S&T and IP content were pursuing a conceptual revision of the whole
policy arena, the managerial reform was pursued to rethink the division of
tasks in the state in much the same way. In the context of IP, while the
previous IP system of BRA had been based on rather paradoxical fragmen-
tation and spreading-out of the policy capacities (e.g. state-owned enter-
prises acting as hubs of sectoral policies), the new reforms foresaw estab-
lishing a policy-implementation split in governance with the central core
retaining (in effect still needing to start building) high-levels of policy capac-
ity. Overall, these reforms can be characterised as attempts to create a clas-
sical state structure that strikes a balance between Weberian and NPM
19ideals. At the same time, the model required creation or existence of high
state policy capacities to revise and coordinate policies on the broad scale
(i.e. on all levels of the framework).
Looking at the coordination dynamics at the level of the policy arena and
stakeholder inclusion, it can be said that the period introduced significant
clashes  between  what  could  be  seen  as  an  ideal  IP  and  what  can  be
described as the realistic model. Namely, it was presumed (by the IP ideas)
that the market forces directing the S&T and IP would create new links
between relevant stakeholders in innovation processes – that is between
S&T performers and industrial partners with the state or bureaucracy limit-
ing its role to network facilitator or supporter that deals with market fail-
ures. At the same time, as liberalisation and radical transformation of the
existing S&T and production system had reduced S&T and innovation capa-
bilities of both sides (leading public R&D performers to internal competition
and industrial stakeholders to global competition, where they were severe-
ly disadvantaged), the expected coordination dynamics have not materi-
alised. Further, the ability of the state to take the central role in coordinat-
ing the policy arena has been challenged be the reformulation of the gover-
nance model because the new policy model of hierarchical policy-adminis-
tration split, although being more rational and transparent, presumed that
the state has policy capacities at the top of the hierarchy while the past
experience indicates that the policy capacities have existed in lower levels
of governance (i.e. pockets of efficiency).
3.2 Trajectories of IP reform in Estonia up to the 2000s
3.2.1 The legacies of the Soviet era (from the 1940s-1990s)
The case of Estonia provides a somewhat different picture about the relevance
of historical legacies. Because of the occupation period and centrally planned
policy model of the Soviet Union, it is often stated that in terms of public poli-
cies such as the IP and public management, ex-Soviet republics like EST start-
ed the 1990s from ‘scratch’ (e.g. Tõnnisson and Randma-Liiv, 2009; also for
R&D and IP policies, see Kristapsons et al., 2004). Because of the centralised
management (from Moscow) of key policy and societal fields (including the
organisation of state and economics), the ex-Soviet republics lacked substan-
tive  policy  autonomy  during  the  occupation  and  consequently,  they  also
lacked the policy capacity for autonomous policy-making during the transition
period. Thus, the Soviet state structure dismantled most of the state struc-
tures and capacities initiated during the 1
st republic from 1918 to 1940. 
The Soviet period was characterised by a state-led/planned industrial policy
supported by extensive S&T policy that was centrally controlled by the
Soviet Union, and not so much by the state apparatus of EST. Therefore,
20distinction of governance and state capacities can not be limited to nation-
al boundaries – in many ways the hierarchical centre of policy autonomy
(definition of IP and S&T policy ideas; definition and design of policy arena
and stakeholder involvement; development of policy capacities within the
governance system) was steered by the Soviet Union on behalf of national
entities, such as EST.
Thus, the whole Eastern European S&T and production system presented a
rather unique mode of coordination and inclusion of relevant stakeholders
and implementation of policy. Radosevic (1998, 1999) has argued that the
resulting S&T and economic production system was characterised by a
complex system of planning and cooperation, and high diversification with
Academies  of  Sciences,  universities,  industrial  research  institutes  and
industrial corporations representing a complicated division of tasks (divided
across the conventional lines of public interest and market forces). The
state owned and controlled all the institutions of industrial and innovation
systems and the state designed them in a distinct functional model of a
planned economy (e.g. Beblavy, 2002; Radosevic, 1998, 1999) – policy
planning was consolidated into planning institutions (that negotiated with
interested ‘groupings’), basic science was consolidated into Academies of
Science and its’ institutions, both public and private/industrial R&D were
consolidated into research institutes, universities were specialised in teach-
ing only, state firms were specialised in production functions (i.e. even
problems  of  production  were  solved  outside  the  factories  and  firms,  in
research institutes). 
Therefore, the role of the state in economic and S&T policy was highly influ-
ential, to the extent of reducing the role for autonomous capacities of other
actors in the production/innovation systems. In addition, the core policy
capacities were stocked outside the national policy intuitions. Thus, on the
one hand, from the perspective of the relationship between state and soci-
ety, the system was highly centralised and even hierarchical, but on differ-
ent functional lines than in market economies. On the other hand, from the
perspective of coordination and governance of the IP activities, the system
seemed highly specialised and fragmented. But again, the broader coordi-
nation model of the policy arena (although unorthodox by conventional
understanding of policy-making) created the framework for the relative suc-
cess of this IP governance model.
3.2.2 The Washington Consensus period in the 1990s
The start of the democratic era in the 1990s created a ‘window of oppor-
tunity’ for radical reforms. It can be argued that the Eastern European coun-
tries followed a radical shift of the S&T and economic policies that was
mediated by strong normative and conditional pressures by the Washington
21Consensus institutions and the EU. Initially it resulted in a no-policy IP peri-
od during the 1990s (see Karo and Kattel, 2010a) that was based on poli-
cies of liberalisation, privatisation and the attraction of FDI and foreign tech-
nology. As a result, the old S&T and industrial policy structure was con-
sciously dismantled (see also Tiits et al., 2008; Kattel, 2010b), and new
mechanisms of market-based IP were introduced. 
At the same time, as the collapse of the Soviet Union was not merely a
regime change, but institutionalised re-independence of nations, such as
EST, the new countries needed to re-build a basic state structure from
scratch (thus, starting at the highest levels of potential policy coordination
challenges). Policies and ideas for fostering IP in EST remained limited to
macroeconomic policies (to guarantee stability) and R&D policies. It has
been argued (see Kristapsons et al., 2004) that the Baltic States (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania) pursued the most radical reforms of the S&T system.
These countries pursued conscious dismantling, consolidation and ‘mar-
ketisation’ of the system of academies of sciences and industrial research
institutions that further reinforced the no-policy IP idea. The liberalised mar-
kets did not have sufficient absorptive capacities to pursue industrial R&D
and the academic university sector was steered towards a market-based
model  with  high  levels  of  competition  based  on  international  academic
excellence. (see Kattel, 2004; Karo, 2010; Masso and Ukrainksi, 2009)
In terms of governance reforms, the 1990s resulted in similar fundamental
revisions of the state governance principles. On the one hand, the reforms
pursued basic legislative reforms and the introduction of basic state structures
(in  IP,  this  included  the  adoption  of  basic  structures  such  as  the  R&D
Organization Act in 1994 and revised in 1997; the establishment of the R&D
Council in 1994 etc. – for a more detailed overview, see Kristapsons et al.,
2004; Karo, forthcoming). Most of the key generic legislation was adopted
from the mid-1990s onwards. This has directed the state and general gover-
nance of IP from the institutional confusion of the post-Soviet years towards
a minimal state with a basic hierarchical structure and legislation. By 2000s
the model started to develop into a managerial state with a high emphasis on
private-sector management principles, a mixed system of civil service (some
Weberian  elements,  but  an  open  and  flexible  system)  and  private-sector
organisational  characteristics  (policy-administrative  split,  division  of  tasks
between traditional hierarchical ministries and agencies, with high-level coor-
dination mechanisms introduced etc). (For a general trajectory, see Tõnnisson
and Randma-Liiv, 2009; Drechsler, 2004) The IP governance reforms paral-
leled these reforms and EST established the basic market-based IP system
with conscious IP prioritisation by around 2002 (see also Karo, forthcoming). 
The emerging IP model presumed that the state should have high levels of
policy capacity at the top of the governance hierarchy. But as most of the IP
22governance reforms in economic policy spheres have been steered towards
de-bureaucratization (but bureaucratization was a different phenomenon than
in democracies – see Randma-Liiv, 2009), the emphasis on policy capacity
has been actually limited. Therefore, despite the fact that both from the per-
spective of IP ideas and governance EST was pursuing rather modern IP
reforms in the 1990s, the overall evaluation of the 1990s still characterises
this period as the lost decade in terms of IP performance (e.g., Tiits et al.,
2008; Kattel, 2004 and 2010b). It is possible to argue that this is a problem
of the de-contextualisation of IP reforms (see also Karo and Kattel, 2010a). 
Namely, similarly to BRA, the 1990s brought about new ideas on IP and the
role of different stakeholders whereby IP is designed and developed hori-
zontally and based on market signals and the core relationships that define
the trajectory are built between the R&D and industrial stakeholders (i.e.
narrow S&T –based perspective of IP) with the state and bureaucracy lim-
ited to network facilitation and rectifying market failures. Similarly to BRA,
the liberalisation and marketisation reforms had a negative impact on the IP
capacities  and  innovation  capabilities  –  the  reforms  dismantled  existing
S&T&I structures and replaced them with formally clear model that follows
the classical policy logic. But the model contradicted the legacies of the
Soviet  S&T&I  arena  where  private-sector  industrial  initiative  (and
autonomous policy capacities) was lacking. The beginning of the 1990s
introduced a new group of stakeholders (private-sector industrial elite) that
lacked the experience and culture of relationships with either dominant pub-
lic sector R&D stakeholders or the state as a whole. Thus, although the
model presumed that the existing actors and capabilities to form the policy
arena exist, the reforms of the 1990s (seeking to create a coherent policy
and governance structure) had actually had reverse effects.
In this context, it can also be argued that the main reasons for the emer-
gence of the new and more extensive/conscious IP ideas in the end of
1990s lie in the external pressures and not so much in the national trajec-
tories. IP proper emerged in EST with the prospect of and financial support
backing the accession to the EU in the late 1990s and 2000s (see Karo and
Kattel, 2010a; Kattel, 2004, Kattel et al., 2009; Karo, 2010 and forth-
coming; Suurna and Kattel, 2010) that created normative and coercive iso-
morphic pressures to converge both on the content and context of IP as fol-
lowed by the more developed EU. 
3.3 Innovation policy challenges of the 2000s in EST and BRA
Overall, both BRA and EST entered the 2000s with the defined challenge
to rebuild IP capacities in both the public and private sectors and to foster
linkages between different stakeholders. Since the 2000s, both countries
23have introduced national strategic policies (e.g. Industry, technology and
foreign trade policy, PITCE and Guidelines to a Development Agenda adopt-
ed  in  2003  by  BRA;  Knowledge-based  Estonia  2002-2006  and  2007-
2013;) that prioritise the need to overcome the low intensity of private-sec-
tor R&D, to foster better linkages between industry and public S&T, and to
increase the capacity of the government to provide integrated and coherent
IP (that is to broaden the scope and links of IP). 
In this context, BRA has introduced the Sector Fund Program, Innovation
Law and several coordination mechanisms and bodies that have sought to
institutionalise support for private-sector R&D activities and provide links
between public R&D and private sector innovation activities. Sector Funds
(probably the most important new policy initiative of the 2000s) are tar-
geted funds in key sectors of the economy that channel earmarked taxes
collected from industry revenues into R&D (based on co-financed projects
where the state finances public R&D institutes and the latter need to find
industrial  partners  for  R&D).  Since  the  2000s,  EST  has  initiated
Competence Centres Program and Technology Programs. The Competence
Centres Program (the most complex and intensive policy initiative of the
2000s) has provided co-financing (open competitive funding – broad hori-
zontal priority areas) for the creation of centres (new bodies for R&D&I
activities) by consortia of industry and academia. Technology Programs
have been designed as national coordination programmes that seek to pri-
oritise specific technologies across different horizontal policy measures.
The Assessment of Sector Fund Program (Sa, 2005, Koeller and Cassiolato,
2009,  Araujo  et  al.,  2010)  and  the  Competence  Centre  Program
(Technopolis, 2002 and 2008; Karo, 2010) find that in both cases, one can
witness  both  positive  and  negative  outcomes  of  the  measures.  The
overview of the measures is presented in Table 2.
24In  both  cases,  the  evaluations  have  argued  that  the  expected  linkages
between different sectors tend to remain weak or short-lived (limited to the
duration  of  the  public  financing).  More  critical  assessments  claim  that
although the programmes are designed to be R&D&I programmes, in reali-
ty, they tend to be limited to R&D programmes (as the measures are typi-
cally captured by either academic or business stakeholders). In the case of
BRA, it has also been argued that the funds ‘re-invent’ the IP of the 1970s. 
Conventional IP analysis (e.g. OECD, 2005 and 2010; EIPR, 2008 and 2009)
would claim that countries like EST and BRA need to reform the IP gover-
25
Source: compiled by the authors, based on analyses of the Sector Fund Program (Sa, 2005; Koeller and Cassiolato, 2009; Araujo
et al., 2010) and the Competence Centre Program (Technopolis, 2002 and 2008; Karo, 2010).








Sector Program – BRA
Financial support (co-financing) for projects that fos-
ter university and enterprise partnerships or restore
and expand the scientific and technological infra-
structure of universities and other research institu-
tions.
Target: Enterprises and public R&D institutes (fund-
ing to R&D institutes that need to find partners that
co-finance).
Current fields (17 funds; 12 funds started in 1999-
2002): 2 horizontal funds (for university-industry inter-
action and ICT infrastructure); 15 funds covering tech-
nologies and specific issues (culture, aeronautics, agro-
business, R&D in the Amazon region, marine and river
transport and naval construction, biotechnology, ener-
gy space, water resources, informatics, mineral resour-
ces, oil and gas, health, transportation and telecom).
Measure design: Coordination body for Sector Funds
(created after 2003), Ministry of Science and
Technology, FINEP, National Council for Scientific
and Technological Development (deciding sectors
and funding needs; replying to special requests by
the managing committees of funds).
Implementation: all but the ICT fund (managed by the
Ministry of Communications) are managed by the
FINEP; each fund has its own managing committee.
Funding: special taxes gathered into the National Fund
of Scientific and Technological Development (in 2008,
490 million R$); funding to R&D institutions that need
to find co-financing from the industry.
Positive: increased the funding of R&D and more
bridging links between academia and industry.
Negative: outcomes of the measures have not result-
ed in the expected output in terms of export capaci-
ties, patenting practices etc.; the implementation of
the measures has been challenged by duplication of
IP measures in general, fragmentation of the imple-
mentation structures, the Ministry of Economics lim-
iting the use of tax funds to create reserves for
macro-economic policy goals.
Competence Centre Program – EST
Financial support (co-financing) for consortia of R&D insti-
tutes and enterprises for the creation of new organisations
that pursue industrially relevant pre-competitive and applied
research, product development and commercialisation of
research.
Target: Enterprises and R&D institutes (both local and for-
eign) that create consortia.
Current fields (8 CC financed): biotechnology (food and
medicine); nanotechnology; ICT; machine technologies. 
Measure design: Ministry of Economy and Communications
and Enterprise Estonia.
Implementation: Enterprise Estonia (agency under MoEcC).
Funding: open competitive grant co-financing (together
with enterprises and R&D institutes); national financing pro-
vided by the EU structural assistance and cohesion funds
(2009-2013, overall budget 83 million ᾬ).
Positive: increased the funding of R&D and more bridging
links between academia and industry.
Negative: outcomes of the measures have not resulted in
the expected output in terms of export capacities, patenting
practices etc. (raising questions about expected self-sustain-
ability); the implementation of the measure complicated by
limited steering capacities for the government (form of
organisation of centres – both non-profit and for-profit inde-
pendent organisations allowed – and competitive funding
limiting government involvement capacities), also by aca-
demic and/or industrial capture (some centres dominated by
academic interests as opposed to combined interest in appli-
cable R&D results; some centres dominated by industrial
short-term interests reflected in an emphasis on low-intensity
R&D activities and/or commercial, instead of patenting etc.).nance systems through more efficient and effective implementation of IP
governance models (i.e. reinforcing the policy-administrative split, creating
more efficient coordination mechanisms, increasing stakeholder participation
as part of PPP-based IP). At the same time, based on our framework and his-
torical analysis, it could be argued that these administrative inter- and intra-
policy coordination problems stem from more fundamental coordination chal-
lenges at higher level where the arena for policy and inclusion of stakehold-
ers  are  determined.  Therefore  simple  administrative  or  organizational
improvements of the existing models may not solve the core problems. 
Our analysis has shown that there are at least two core problems why mar-
ket-based and participatory IP models, even if supported by desired gover-
nance structures, may not result in expected IP performance. Both of these
problems stem from the fact that the Washington consensus IP and gover-
nance  models  assumed  away  the  importance  of  historical  legacies  and
exerted de-contextualised external pressures on both countries: 
• Both the market-based and participatory IP models presume pri-
vate  sector  actors  with  high  levels  of  absorptive  capacity  and
future strategic perspectives that overlap with those of public R&D
actors. The historically state centric development models (during 
non-democratic eras) of EST and BRA did not support the emer-
gence of these capabilities in conventional forms (as capabilities 
were placed in non-traditional pockets of efficiency in BRA; and in 
non-market based ‘production chains’ of EST). The marketisation 
and liberalisation reforms of the WC area in reality steered the
capacities and interests of both actors in different directions; most
private sector R&D and innovation potential was gradually substi-
tuted by FDI; most R&D system was steered towards internatio-
nal scientific excellence.
• Both  the  market-based  and  participatory  IP  models  presume 
highly specific state policy capacities and detailed future orienta-
tion (either to predict the market-behaviour or to create future sce-
narios of techno-economic processes). Again, the historical state
centric development models of EST and BRA did not support the
emergence of these capacities in conventional forms (as in BRA
the capacities where located in non-traditional pockets of efficien-
cy  and  levels  of  governance;  and  in  EST  these  where  divided
between ‘supra-national’ communist regime, that defined the poli-
cy  priorities  and  steering  models,  and  national  entities  charac-
terised by more administrative than political roles). The marketi-
sation and liberalisation reforms of the WC area (both in IP and
governance) in reality even reduced the existing capacities (in BRA
the pockets of efficiency lost some of its role, autonomy and capa-
bilities in the reform processes; in EST the reforms underempha-
sised the relevance, or presumed the existence, of long-term poli-
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Legend. Punctuated (….): external (de-contextualised) pressures; Black line: centralisation – frag-
mentation in governance reforms; Dashed (----): focus on domestic capacity building in IP.
Source: Authors.
cy  capacities  and  over-emphasised  the  modernisation  of  the 
administrative structure).
When we try to boil down the descriptions of historical trajectories in BRA
and EST, we can summarise three key sets of variables that have had the
most impact on the different levels of coordination capacity. First, in gen-
eral governance reforms, we see that there is a rather clear cyclical move-
ment, more pronounced in BRA, between centralisation and decentralisa-
tion of the governance systems that affect coordination challenges in some-
what opposing directions. In the reforms of IP ideas, we can in turn see a
similarly cyclical oscillation around the policy focus on domestic industrial
capabilities or on international competitiveness (both in the form of export
and high-tech orientation). A third significant dimension is the almost lin-
early increasing role of external pressures in both trajectories since the late
1980s. Our argument is that the evolution of coordination challenges and
capacities – as a relevant variable for public-sector (state) capacity in IP –
has taken place both in BRA and EST in an arena created and fundamen-
tally impacted by these three dimensions. As we saw above, these three
dimensions are in fact often in conflict and working or effective models are
hard to build based on the conventional lines of IP analysis – indeed, both
merely IP and PAM confined analysis are likely to simplify the challenges.
Figure 2 attempts to visualise the different trajectories described above that
shaped these three pivotal IP governance dimensions.
Figure 2. Evolution of IP/PAM reforms and external pressures in BRA and EST innova-
tion policy governance, 1960s-2000s (Brazil on the left; Estonia on the right).The visualisation attempts to show how conflicting in our view reforms in
IP ideas and resulting IP governance have been in Brazil and Estonia and
how external pressures have further complicated the interplay between his-
torical legacies and reforms of IP ideas and governance models. The figure
attempts, in other words, to visualise how coordination problems come
about and why they persist in BRA and EST. We chose two highly differ-
ent catching-up economies, and yet the analytical focus on IP and gover-
nance reforms has made it possible in our view to unearth significant fac-
tors  determining  how  coordination  challenges  and  capacities  evolve  in
catching-up economies. We can claim that the external pressures of the
1980s and 1990s have in both cases assumed away the significance of his-
torical legacies in both EST and BRA. While a somewhat feasible strategy
in the context of designing ideal-type IP models, clearly this is a dangerous
avenue in the case of designing governance reforms that tend to be more
incremental but in the end are the sources through which ideas of IP are
translated into the reality. In both cases the external pressures have led
towards limited ability to steer IP to focus on domestic capacity building. In
both cases the state, although historically having been rather active (and
successful) in S&T and R&D policies, seems to lack policy capacities to
coordinate policy efforts in desired manner. Our analysis indicates that the
coordination challenges is not only an administrative or governance chal-
lenge but a more fundamental challenges of aligning ideal-type policies with
contextual socio-economic capacities and capabilities. 
4. Conclusions
The paper has argued that conventional frameworks for IP analysis under-
estimate the relevance of general state and governance development tra-
jectories in the emergence and evolution of IP. Therefore in this paper, we
have built an analytical framework for IP analysis by linking together the
two perspectives of IP ideas and wider state governance reforms. We have
hypothesised that in developing countries these trajectories, although often
presumed by the IP ideas, are almost never in sync and complementary
because external pressures and historical legacies affect both trajectories.
We have proposed that the challenges that emerge from these out-of-sync
developments can be analysed though the lens of policy coordination (as it
is often done in policy rhetoric) that has to be seen as a multi-level concept
encompassing both definition of the policy arena and stakeholders, and
issues of intra- and inter-policy coordination.
In this paper, we have conducted stylised case studies of BRA and EST that
highlight the existence of periods where theoretically dysfunctional gover-
nance systems provide positive outcomes in IP performance (in BRA and
EST during the ISI/Soviet periods) and theoretically more functional and log-
28ical  governance  systems  provide  negative  outcomes  (the  1990s  and
2000s). This can be explained by either contextually supportive (ISI period),
or dysfunctional (Washington Consensus period) stakeholder relationships
and coordination mechanism at the level of the policy arena (and below). 
Both our hypothesis and the issue of coordination are uncharted issues in
the field of innovation policy. This research seeks to provide first steps
towards having a more elaborated understanding of the perceived need to
better coordinate different parts of innovation policies. Our case studies
indicate that at least in the field of IP, policy capacity and autonomy tend
to be highly fragmented (and decentralised) in catching-up countries (or at
least there are high pressures towards these tendencies). This seems to be
one of the root causes of coordination problems, but our analysis also indi-
cates that the solutions to this problem may proceed from higher and more
complex issues of policy coordination. In catching-up countries, it may be
highly likely that key policy capacity and autonomy may be located in unex-
pected locations. Manning (2001) has argued that the structural reforms of
the 1990s in developing countries have followed more often the donor con-
ditionality than conscious autonomous reform choices of governments. In
other cases, the success (and the goal) of the structural reforms towards a
more decentralised and specialised structure should be seen in terms of pro-
viding a complementary stream of policy capacity next to the politicised or
low-capacity ministries (see also Wettenhall, 2003).
These locations depend on the inter-linkages of historical legacies, external
pressures and the local state capacity to come up with contextualised solu-
tions to the development problems. Taking stock of existing public man-
agement reforms and developments (also research) seems to be a necessi-
ty for analysing case studies in different catching-up countries. In light of
the  research  by  Evans,  Amsden  and  Wade,  who  studied  the  role  of
Weberian principles as the core of state capacity, the current research on
innovation policy has to move towards an analysis of how different coun-
tries have steered, controlled and coped with the pressures of managerial-
ism that have challenged the Weberian principles and historical modes of
state-capacity creation.
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